We apply the EMF 23 study design to simulate the effects of the reference case and the scenarios to European natural gas supplies to 2025. We use GASMOD, a strategic several-layer model of European gas supply, consisting of upstream natural gas producers, traders in each consuming European country (or region), and final demand. Our model results suggest rather modest changes in the overall supply situation of natural gas to Europe, indicating that current worries about energy supply security issues may be overrated. LNG will likely increase its share of European natural gas imports in the future, Russia will not dominate the European imports (~ share of 1/3), the Middle East will continue to be a rather modest supplier, the UK is successfully converting from being a natural gas exporter to become a transit node for LNG towards continental Europe, and congested pipeline infrastructure, and in some cases LNG terminals, will remain a feature of the European gas markets, but less than in the current situation.
Introduction: The European Natural Gas Market
The European natural gas market lends itself particularly to the EMF 23 study design. It is in the middle of a deep structural change that comprises both, restructuring and vertical unbundling, as well as changing supply relations. Contrary to the reform process in the U.S., restructuring in continental Europe has only started seriously with the second European Gas Directive (2003/55/EC, so-called "Acceleration Directive") whereas the UK had started the reform of its natural gas sector in the early 1990s already. In continental Europe, a small number of players still dominate the national wholesale markets; vertical unbundling is pursued by most member states, though with varying degrees of success. The individual countries are poorly interconnected, and the limited access to pipeline capacity prevents liquid hubs from emerging.
The second aspect, supply structures, also plays an important role in the energy policy debate, and it is the focus of this paper. Europe is a relatively mature pipeline market, with a significant increase in LNG regasification capacity and imports over the last years (IEA (2004 (IEA ( , 2007 . In the next decades, the demand for natural gas is generally expected to rise, albeit with some uncertainty on the extent given new developments that may reduce the relative benefit of gas in environmental or cost terms (e.g. in competition with coal with CCS for power production). In institutional terms, European gas supplies are also undergoing the global trend from long-term contracts towards shorter-term trading and a more important role for spot markets. "Energy supply security" is a particularly sensitive issue in European gas, in particular with a view to the dominant supplier, Russia.
The issues mentioned have been covered in previous literature. Thus, several models have indicated that market power is indeed an issue in the European natural gas market, amongst them Boots et al. (2004) , Egging and Gabriel (2006) , and Egging et al. (2008) . Smeers (2008) summarized and discussed the papers that develop strategic models of European gas supply. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2003) and Hubert and Suleymanova (2006) have focused on the specific role of Russia as a supplier to Europe, and the strategic role of transit countries such as Ukraine or Poland. OME (2001, 2005) have provided in-depth figures of potential prices and quantities of gas supply options for the EU. Stern (2007) provides a balanced discussion of the true "supply security" issues.
In this paper, we report simulation results for European natural gas supplies to 2025, following the EMF 23 study design (EMF, 2007) . We apply a strategic model of European gas supply, called GASMOD, that was developed in the early phase of the EMF 23 study, and then slightly adopted to suit the requirements of the EMF 23 study design. The GASMOD model is described in detail in Holz et al. (2008) , and therefore will not be presented in detail in this paper. Instead, we focus on the results of GASMOD with regard to the EMF 23 Reference case, and most of the EMF 23 scenarios (see EMF, 2007, p. 30) . The next section provides a non-technical model description and discusses data sources and assumptions. Section 3 then summarizes the model results for the EMF Reference case, and five scenarios: higher demand growth, Russian exports constrained, Middle East exports constrained, Middle East & Russian exports constrained, and liquefaction constrained. We put particular emphasis on the future role of Russia, potential alternative supply sources, and model results for the UK market in transition.
In general, our results suggest rather modest changes in the overall supply situation of natural gas to Europe. This also indicates that current worries about energy supply security issues may be overrated:
• LNG will likely increase its share of European natural gas imports in the future, but stay relatively stable beyond 2015; • Russia will continue to play an important role as a supplier to Europe (~ 1/3 of imports), but it will not play the dominant role that many studies (and politicians) suggest it might play; • In the time frame of our analysis (2025), the Middle East will continue to be a rather modest supplier, and its exports are more likely to be directed to the Asian and the North American markets;
• The UK is in the process of successfully converting from being a natural gas exporter to become an importer and a transit node for LNG towards continental Europe;
• Congested pipeline infrastructure, and in some cases LNG terminals, will remain a feature of the European gas markets, but less than in the current situation;
• The diversification of natural gas supplies, already observed in this decade, should continue and contribute to supply security.
The GASMOD Model: Model Description and Data Specification
The model used is a modified version of the static GASMOD model. It corresponds to the description by Holz et al. (2008) , except for the regional and technology aggregation (pipeline vs. LNG), the demand function, the time frame and the market power assumptions for certain countries. GASMOD is a model of the European natural gas trade on a yearly basis.
1 It is programmed in GAMS in the mixed complementarity format and solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000) .
We include data for all relevant exporters to Europe, which can supply pipeline gas and/or LNG ( GASMOD is a game-theoretic partia l equilibrium model of the European natural gas market. Exports to Europe and wholesale trade within Europe are represented as successive markets in a two-stage structure. Market power can be assumed in both market stages, thereby leading to double marginalization of the final customers. We assume market power to be exerted in a Cournot framework. A Cournot market model typically yields higher prices than the perfect competition model (or Bertrand models), thereby giving an incentive to more (higher cost) players to participate in the market. The results of this equilibrium model correspond to the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game in each market stage. The model results must therefore be interpreted as long-term market equilibrium that does not reflect the short-term adaptation path to the equilibria. Hence, this model type is also not appropriate to simulate short-term market shocks.
Figure 1: Stylized representation of the GASMOD model setup
In Holz et al. (2008) we consider three stylized cases of market power in each market stage in order to assess the most realistic scenario for the current European gas market: Cournot competition in both market stages, perfect competition in both market stages, and EU liberalization (Cournot competition in export market, and perfect competition in the wholesale market). In line with the market observation we identify the successive Cournot market model as the most realistic representation, but with exceptions for certain countries where the double marginalization structure leads to very high prices and low imports or consumption. Hence, in the GASMOD version used for the EMF simulations, we use a successive Cournot model with a competitive fringe in the export market, and the assumption of perfect competition for certain final markets. On the production market, next to the Cournot players, we assume the small players to be the competitive fringe (Libya, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Trinidad,
and Venezuela, and all domestic European producers except the UK and the Netherlands). On the wholesale market level in Europe, we assume the following markets to be competitive: in the UK, Denmark, Sweden/Finland, Romania/Bulgaria, the Baltic countries, and Turkey. 4 In this paper, we apply the method of comparative static simulations for the time period 2003 -2025.
We simulate the years 2003, 2010 and continue in five-year steps up to 2025. For each year, we adapt the data input, namely the reference demand and import volumes and prices, the production and transport capacities and costs. In the absence of founded knowledge about the future market structure, we assume the same market structure prevailing in all model periods.
In particular, as agreed within the EMF group and based on EIA (2005) little increase in export capacities to Europe after 2020. This is consistent with the assumption that the mature European market will experience a slower demand growth after 2020 because demand substitutions in favor of natural gas will have taken place by then (e.g., in power generation).
3 Results for the EMF Scenarios to 2025
Scenario Overview
We simulated the following scenarios with the GASMOD model: EMF reference scenario (with data as described above), a slightly higher demand growth scenario, constraint on Russian exports to Europe, constraint on Middle East exports to Europe, and constraint on liquefaction capacity. Those cases were agreed upon in the EMF group and are described in EMF (2007). (2007), the European natural gas market demonstrates a lot of resilience and the overall export picture seems to be similar between the scenarios. In particular, Europe will rely to a larger extent on imports than today with only about a sixth from the large domestic producers Netherlands and the UK. 
The Role of Russia
Russia will continue to supply about one third of the European natural gas imports, without, however, hitting any export capacity constraint to Europe (Holz , 2007) . 7 Hence, the EMF scenario of Table 3 ). In the reference scenario, a large part of their LNG exports does not go to the European market but is available for the North American and Pacific (East Asian) market (not included in the GASMOD model). The scenario of constrained liquefaction capacity also highlights which LNG exporters are the preferred suppliers to the European markets in the reference case, namely those where the expected capacity expansion over the periods results in large export volumes and hence in large losses in the "Liquefaction Constraint Scenario" compared to the "EMF Reference Scenario". Table 3 reports that these are mainly Trinidad & Tobago, Egypt and Lib ya. The cost decrease of LNG compared to pipeline exports plays a major role in explaining the high future export potential.
Results for the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is the natural gas market in Europe where several developments that are characteristic for the entire European market take place "in a nutshell". First, the UK market has already undergone a liberalization process to a competitive wholesale market that the European
Commission still struggles to achieve on the European Continent. Moreover, the UK market does not only experience a strong decline in domestic production over the course of the analyzed period (assumed to fall to about 1/6 th of its 2003 level in 2025) but also has the strategy to meet (parts of) the increasing need for imports with LNG. Similarly, decreasing domestic production and increasing (LNG) imports can be observed in Europe as a whole. The UK started to develop LNG regasification projects in the early 2000s and has three operating terminals in 2008 (Milford Haven, Isle of Grain, and an Excelerate vessel in Teesside). There are expansion plans for these terminals and construction plans for three or so more regasification ports in the next decade. In total, the UK will have more than 40 bcm per year of LNG import capacity by 2015. Together with an increased pipeline import volume from Norway and the Continent (Belgium and the Netherlands), this will compensate for the decline in domestic production. Figure 5 shows that the UK can potentially keep its natural gas consumption level stable, thanks to the increased import capacities. The competitive wholesale market with lower prices than on the monopolistic market further enables the UK consumers to maintain their consumption levels.
Infrastructure Bottlenecks in Europe
Several of the trade flows that result from our modeling exercise are constrained by the assumed infrastructure capacities. This is particularly important for all intra-European pipeline flows. Figure 6 shows a stylized map with the congested border capacit ies between the countries in West and Central Europe. Our model data set is based on the assumption that the current European market structure will persist until 2025, with predominantly monopolistic, generally vertically integrated (between wholesale trade and shipping, incl. pipeline ownership) natural gas companies. This market structure has shaped the existing infrastructure situation in Europe with insufficient liquid interconnection between European countries. The monopolistic wholesale companies that are also the owners of the network have no incentive to invest in cross-border capacities because that would give market access to competitors from abroad. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the reference case simulation and scenario calculations of the EMF 23 study design, focusing on the supply and demand situation in Europe. We applied GASMOD, a strategic model of European gas supply. In general, we find that Europe is likely to increase its supply security through diversification: the number of suppliers increases over time, and the role of Russia stays within a reasonable range, with about 1/3 of total imports. We also find that infrastructure availability remains a critical issue, mainly for pipelines. This supports polic ies in favor of higher incentives for infrastructure investments.
The success story of the UK can be seen as a "role model" for the future of European gas supplies.
From being a net exporter, the UK has transformed into a gas importing country, without putting supply security at risk. A competitive industry structure and appropriate network regulation and investment incentives have favored this transition. Our model results suggest that Europe need not to be overly worried about increased import dependence, provided that the institutional framework is adopted accordingly.
Last but not least, let us point out some critical points in the analysis: Demand forecasts are uncertain because of gas price changes, but also because of climate protection policy and the need for lowcarbon technology at scale. Also, our results depend upon the choice of model parameters (e.g. elasticities) and assumptions about new infrastructure to be built. Upcoming research should move from a comparative static analysis to a dynamic model with endogenous investment decisions.
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